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MARYLAND MAKES NEW EVIDENCE POSTCONVICTION 
REVIEW PROVISIONS AVAILABLE 
TO DEFENDANTS WITH PLEA DEALS 
FELICIA LANGEL∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
A guilty plea is not a confession, and defendants who accept plea deals 
are often wrongfully convicted.1  For many years, Maryland permitted in-
mates who made plea deals to use newly discovered evidence, such as 
DNA, to argue that they were entitled to postconviction relief because they 
were innocent.2  When the Maryland Court of Appeals suddenly permitted 
only defendants convicted at trial to access the new evidence postconviction 
provisions, the Maryland legislature promptly acted to restore this access to 
defendants with plea deals.3  The first attempt by the General Assembly to 
reinstate new evidence postconviction review for defendants with plea deals 
ran into resistance from key Maryland stakeholders, but the General As-
sembly satisfied their concerns and amended the law during the next legis-
lative session.4 
Part I will discuss (A) why guilty pleas often lead to wrongfully con-
victed defendants;5 (B) that defendants with plea deals were not previously 
barred from using the new evidence postconviction review provisions;6 (C) 
why the Court of Appeals decided to narrowly interpret those provisions 
with respect to defendants with plea deals;7 and (D) how the General As-
sembly thereafter restored the new evidence postconviction review mecha-
nisms for these defendants.8  Part II will discuss (A) that the legislature sat-
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 1.  Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1415 (2016); see infra Section I.A. 
 2.  See infra Section I.B. 
 3.  See infra Sections I.C–D. 
 4.  See infra Section I.D; see also S. 423, 2018 Leg., 438th Sess. (Md. 2018) (voting record). 
 5.  See infra Section I.A. 
 6.  See infra Section I.B. 
 7.  See infra Section I.C.  
 8.  See infra Section I.D. 
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isfied the concerns of the judiciary regarding issues of procedural guidance 
and protection of judicial resources;9 (B) that the legislature satisfied the 
concerns of the State over building a case from the minimalist factual rec-
ord of plea deal cases;10 and (C) how new evidence favors substantive accu-
racy over finality.11 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The Maryland legislature enacted postconviction review12 provisions 
specific to claims involving newly discovered DNA and other evidence of 
innocence in 2001 and 2009, but the statutes did not include language spe-
cific to defendants with plea deals.13  Consequently, for many years defend-
ants with plea deals were not precluded from availing themselves of these 
innocence mechanisms when new potentially exculpatory evidence 
emerged.14  When the Court of Appeals abruptly ended this practice in 
2016, the General Assembly acted quickly to amend the statutes to restore 
access to the new evidence postconviction remedies for these defendants.15  
Section A evaluates why plea deals often lead to wrongfully convicted de-
fendants for whom postconviction review could result in exoneration.16  
Next, Section B discusses that, prior to 2016, defendants with plea deals 
could use the new evidence postconviction review mechanisms to argue 
their innocence.17  Then, Section C reviews why the Court of Appeals de-
cided to interpret the statutes as barring access to the new evidence post-
conviction review provisions for these defendants.18  Finally, Section D dis-
cusses how the legislature amended the postconviction review statutes to 
                                                          
 9.  See infra Section II.A. 
 10.  See infra Section II.B. 
 11.  See infra Section II.C. 
 12.  Postconviction review allows a defendant to challenge their conviction by petitioning for 
a new case.  Nancy J. King, Judicial Review: Appeals and Postconviction Proceedings, in 
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 217 (Alison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014). 
 13.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (LexisNexis 2001); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC. § 8-301 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 14.  See infra Section I.B.  For fourteen years after the 2001 and 2009 statutes were enacted, 
defendants with plea deals offered new evidence in six Maryland cases.  State v. Matthews, 415 
Md. 286, 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Thompson v. State, 411 Md. 664, 985 A.2d 32 (2009); Gregg v. 
State, 409 Md. 698, 976 A.2d 999 (2009); Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 976 A.2d 1012 (2009); 
Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 (2007); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 909 A.2d 1020 
(2006).  In five of these cases, the court granted the defendant’s petition for postconviction re-
view.  Matthews, 415 Md. at 312, 999 A.2d at 1066; Thompson, 411 Md. at 694, 985 A.2d at 50; 
Gregg, 409 Md. at 721, 976 A.2d at 1012; Simms, 409 Md. at 734, 976 A.2d at 1020; Arey, 400 
Md. at 509, 929 A.2d at 512.  In the sixth case, however, the court denied the defendant’s petition 
on procedural grounds.  Blake, 395 Md. at 238, 909 A.2d at 1035.   
 15.  See infra Sections I.C–D. 
 16.  See infra Section I.A. 
 17.  See infra Section I.B. 
 18.  See infra Section I.C. 
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provide a permanent means for defendants with plea deals to help prove 
their innocence with newly discovered evidence.19 
A.  Guilty Pleas Often Lead to Wrongfully Convicted Defendants 
It is axiomatic in criminal law that many “innocent people will plead 
guilty rather than risk going to trial.”20  This is because “innocent defend-
ants who plead guilty almost always get lighter sentences than those who 
are convicted at trial”—forcing defendants to conduct a crucial cost-benefit 
analysis.21  Of the 1,702 exonerations compiled by the National Registry of 
Exonerations as of November 2015, 261 (15%) of exonerees pleaded 
guilty.22  In its 2018 testimony to the Maryland General Assembly, the In-
nocence Project, a non-profit organization that works to overturn wrongful 
convictions, reported that, based on DNA evidence, “over 10% of ex-
onerees were wrongfully convicted as the result of a guilty plea.”23  Further, 
the Innocence Project maintained that the true criminal perpetrator was 
identified in 84% of these cases, largely because of postconviction DNA 
testing.24 
A guilty plea generally provides a mutual advantage for the defendant 
and the state, which may explain why 95% of federal and state felony cases 
are resolved using plea deals.25  The defendant is incentivized to plead 
guilty in lieu of going to trial because of the possibility of a “lesser penalty 
than the sentence that could be imposed after a trial and a verdict of 
guilty.”26  The state is incentivized to offer this bargain because the state no 
longer carries the burden of proof at trial, and thereby eases its administra-
tive workload.27 
A guilty plea, however, provides a disproportionate disadvantage for 
the defendant relative to the state.  For the state, the disadvantage is the risk 
                                                          
 19.  See infra Section I.D. 
 20.  Amshula Jayaram, Policy Advocate, Innocence Project, Testimony for Hearing on S.B. 
423 Before the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm. in Support of Postconviction DNA Testing and 
Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence, 2018 Leg., 438th Sess. 1 (Md. 2018) [hereinafter Jayaram, 
Testimony on S.B. 423] (on file with author).  
 21.  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, INNOCENTS WHO PLEAD GUILTY 1 (2015), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article1.pdf. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Michele Nethercott et al., Univ. Balt. Innocence Clinic, Letter to S. Judicial Proceedings 
Comm. Concerning S.B. 675 and S.B. 677, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. 7 (Md. 2017) [hereinafter 
Nethercott et al., Letter Concerning S.B. 675 and S.B. 677] (on file with author). 
 24.  Id.; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, POST CONVICTION DNA TESTING 1 
(2013), http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/cj/PostConvictionDNATesting.pdf. 
 25.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); see also Class v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 798, 807 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 26.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 751. 
 27.  Robert N. Shwartz, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of “Present but Unknowable” Constitu-
tional Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1460 (1974). 
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of a postconviction challenge to the conviction and the “arduous task” of 
building a case from the minimalist factual record of the plea deal,28 possi-
bly years after the original indictment.29  For the defendant, who (1) may 
have limited financial and legal resources; (2) is pressured by a hurried 
criminal justice system; or (3) is possibly coerced into accepting a plea deal, 
the huge disadvantages of a guilty plea include life imprisonment or possi-
bly death for a crime they did not commit.30 
In the late 1980s, because of a growing number of DNA-linked exon-
erations, DNA testing became a powerful forensic tool for wrongfully con-
victed defendants.31  Private industry, international academia, and legal en-
tities collaborated to create testing standards and DNA testing methods that 
are now highly sensitive, efficient, and reproducible.32  The predominant 
DNA testing method in use by law enforcement is the analysis of thirteen 
genetic markers using small lengths of DNA called short tandem repeats 
(“STR”).33  The thirteen STR markers for a given individual’s DNA may be 
(1) represented as one marker (the same trait inherited from both parents); 
or (2) represented as two markers (a different trait inherited from each par-
ent).34  The likelihood that two people will share all thirteen STR markers is 
one in a billion.35  Thus, in a forensics context, if the suspect’s DNA match-
es the DNA found at the crime scene, the chances that the crime scene DNA 
came from someone other than the suspect is “at most one in a billion.”36  
Moreover, in addition to the inculpatory value of DNA testing, 11.6% of 
wrongful convictions “yield[] exculpatory DNA evidence that would be 
supportive of the convicted suspect’s exoneration.”37  Hence, when guilty 
                                                          
 28.  Although the Maryland procedural rule is vague regarding the amount of evidence that 
the State must gather for the plea deal case record, the court requires enough evidence in the rec-
ord to inquire “into the factual basis for the plea.”  MD. R. 4-242(c) (2018); Jacqueline E. Ross, 
The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
717, 721 (2006). 
 29.  Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights 
in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1236 n.46 (1977) (citing United States v. Sams, 
521 F.2d 421, 426 (3d Cir, 1975)). 
 30.  Jayaram, Testimony on S.B. 423, supra note 20, at 6; Nethercott et al., Letter Concerning 
S.B. 675 and S.B. 677, supra note 23, at 2. 
 31.  Emily West & Vanessa Meterko, Innocence Project: DNA Exonerations, 1989–2014: 
Review of Data and Findings from the First 25 Years, 79 ALB. L. REV. 717, 717 (2016).  Over 
these twenty-five years, DNA testing exonerated 325 wrongfully convicted defendants.  Id. 
 32.  Lutz Roewer, DNA Fingerprinting in Forensics: Past, Present, Future, 4 INVESTIGATIVE 
GENETICS, Dec. 2013, at 2, 3. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  NAT’L FORENSIC SCI. TECH. CTR., A SIMPLIFIED GUIDE TO DNA EVIDENCE (2013), 
http://www.forensicsciencesimplified.org/dna/how.html. 
 35.  Roewer, supra note 32, at 4. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  KELLY WALSH ET AL., URBAN INST., ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION 10 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251115.pdf.  This work refined 
a previous Urban Institute study (JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., POST-CONVICTION DNA 
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pleas lead to wrongful convictions, postconviction review predicated on 
new evidence, such as DNA, can be exonerating. 
B.  For Fourteen Years, Postconviction Review with Newly Discovered 
Evidence Was Available to Defendants with Plea Deals 
In 200138 and 2009,39 the Maryland legislature enacted two statutes 
that created mechanisms for postconviction review when new evidence 
emerged.  DNA Evidence—Postconviction Review, Section 8-201, and Pe-
tition for Writ of Actual Innocence, Section 8-301, were an acknowledge-
ment by the legislature that modern forensics, such as DNA testing, played 
an increasingly critical role in exonerating wrongfully convicted defend-
ants.40  The legislature in 2001 and 2009, however, was sensitive to the risk 
of overburdening the Maryland court system with frivolous postconviction 
review challenges; therefore, it limited the use of these statutes to new ex-
culpatory evidence: (1) Section 8-201 required that “a reasonable probabil-
ity exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce results 
materially relevant to the petitioner’s assertion of innocence;”41 and (2) 
Section 8-301 required that the newly discovered evidence “creates a sub-
stantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different” 
had the evidence been introduced prior to conviction.42 
 From 2001 until 2016, defendants who accepted plea deals were not 
specifically precluded from seeking new evidence postconviction review 
under the plain language of Sections 8-201 and 8-301.43  Such was the case 
for two Maryland defendants, Jerry Lee Jenkins and Anthony Gray, who 
accepted plea deals but were later exonerated using postconviction re-
view.44  In 1986, Jerry Lee Jenkins maintained he was innocent of raping a 
                                                          
TESTING AND WRONGFUL CONVICTION (2012), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238816.pdf) by adding felony case processing records 
“to reclassify case outcomes and calculate an estimated rate of wrongful conviction for similar 
convictions in Virginia.”  Id. at 2.  This data was externally validated by comparing it to 1985 fel-
ony cases from forty-three states.  Id. 
 38.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (LexisNexis 2001). 
 39.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-301 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 40.  With the initial passage of Section 8-201, Maryland joined the “nationwide trend” of 
adopting DNA testing as a vehicle for exonerating the actually innocent.  See Yonga v. State, 446 
Md. 183, 197, 130 A.3d 486, 494 n.12 (2016) (citing Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 218–19, 909 
A.2d 1020, 1023 (2006)).  Compare Actually Innocent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (where the facts do not support the criminal sentence), with Legally Innocent, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (where one or more legal bases to support the criminal sen-
tence are absent).  With the passage of Section 8-301, the legislature intended that actually inno-
cent defendants be given an opportunity to seek postconviction review whenever new evidence 
emerged.  Yonga, 446 Md. at 198, 130 A.3d at 494. 
 41.  § 8-201(a)(5) (2001). 
 42.  § 8-301(a)(1) (2009). 
 43.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 8-201, 8-301 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 44.  Nethercott et al., Letter Concerning S.B. 675 and S.B. 677, supra note 23, at 3. 
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real estate agent at a model home in Waldorf, Maryland.45  The 1986 rape 
closely resembled another rape from 1984 that took place a few miles away, 
and the police believed they were dealing with a serial rapist.46  However, 
soon after Jenkins was interviewed about the 1986 rape, biological evidence 
from the 1984 rape excluded him.47  Subsequently, the police dropped the 
serial rapist theory and charged Jenkins with the 1986 rape.48  Prior to trial, 
the rape victim could not affirmatively identify Jenkins in a photo lineup, 
and during the trial, the victim “admitted to the jury, ‘I cannot say that I can 
positively identify him.’”49  Jenkins was convicted of the 1986 rape and 
sentenced to life in prison.50 
In 1988, just before Jenkins’s sentencing hearing, DNA testing of bio-
logical evidence from the 1986 crime scene was inconclusive.51  In 1995, 
Jenkins attempted to have the biological evidence reanalyzed using more 
modern DNA methods, but the motion was denied.52  On a separate motion 
for a new trial that was also denied, the judge remarked that “there could be 
no stronger evidence for the defendant than evidence that two similar 
crimes were committed, and that the defendant couldn’t possibly have 
committed one of them.”53  In 2000, Jenkins filed another motion for a new 
trial, but the prosecution, mindful of the weakness of its case against Jen-
kins, offered to vacate the conviction and recommend a forty-year prison 
sentence if Jenkins entered an Alford plea.54  Jenkins accepted the plea deal 
and, pursuant to the deal, was released from prison in 2010.55  In 2011, the 
biological evidence from the 1986 rape was tested using present day DNA 
techniques and revealed that Jenkins could not have been the perpetrator.56  
Jenkins was re-tried in 2013, and his case was dismissed.57 
                                                          
 45.  Maurice Possley, Jerry Lee Jenkins, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4191; Maryland v. 
Jenkins, No. 08-K-86-000423 (Cir. Court Charles Cty. Oct. 3, 1986).  
 46.  Possley, supra note 45. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  A defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters an Alford plea as part of a plea deal but 
does not admit guilt.  Alford plea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see Possley, supra 
note 45. 
 55.  Possley, supra note 45. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
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In 1991, during a robbery, Linda May Pellicano was raped and mur-
dered in her home in Calvert County, Maryland.58  Anthony Gray and two 
other suspects were arrested and charged with the rape and murder.59  Gray, 
who had an I.Q. of seventy-nine and was enrolled in a “special education” 
program, was incarcerated and interrogated without legal representation for 
nearly two months.60  Although Gray initially denied involvement in the 
crime, he eventually confessed, and, in exchange for testifying against his 
supposed co-conspirators, Gray pleaded guilty to first-degree rape and was 
sentenced to life in prison.61  Seven and a half years into Gray’s sentence, 
“the State’s attorney located Mrs. Pellicano’s actual murderer by matching 
the DNA collected in this case to that of [another individual] and, subse-
quently, obtained a conviction with respect to that individual.”62  Gray was 
granted a new trial, but due to lack of evidence, Gray’s case was dismissed 
in 1999.63  For Jenkins and Gray, justice was restored because, under the 
2001 and 2009 Section 8-201 and 8-301 statutes, these defendants could 
seek postconviction relief using new evidence and notwithstanding their 
previous plea deals.   
C.  In 2016, the Maryland Court of Appeals Barred Postconviction 
Review Using New Evidence for Defendants with Plea Deals 
What had been an expectation that newly discovered evidence would 
provide an additional means for defendants with plea deals to seek postcon-
viction review, became a bar to access when the Maryland Court of Appeals 
handed down its decisions in two seminal cases in 2016.  The case, Yonga 
v. State,64 began in 2006 when Sam Yonga was a twenty-five-year-old im-
migrant from Sierra Leone who became acquainted with thirteen-year-old, 
“T.R.,” on a telephone chat line.65  After T.R. invited Yonga to her home, 
the two started to engage in sexual activity, when the couple was interrupt-
ed by T.R’s mother.66  Yonga dropped his cell phone as he rushed to leave, 
and T.R.’s mother contacted the police.67  Yonga was arrested and pleaded 
                                                          
 58.  Gray v. Maryland, 228 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632 (D. Md. 2002); Maurice Possley, Anthony 
Gray, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Aug. 26, 2017), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3254. 
 59.  Gray, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 632. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 632–33.  Life imprisonment was Gray’s reduced sentence for his plea, and the court 
did not inform Gray of the maximum penalty under his plea deal.  Amended Complaint ¶ 36, 
Gray, 228 F. Supp. 2d 628 (No. CCB-02-CV-385). 
 62.  Gray, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 633. 
 63.  Id. at 633–34. 
 64.  446 Md. 183, 130 A.3d 486 (2016). 
 65.  Id. at 185, 130 A.3d at 487. 
 66.  Id. at 186, 130 A.3d at 487. 
 67.  Id. 
 48 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 78:41 
guilty to a third-degree sexual offense.68  Six years later, T.R. recanted, and 
Yonga petitioned for a writ of actual innocence under Section 8-301.69  In 
his petition, Yonga challenged the conviction by asserting that T.R.’s re-
traction was newly discovered evidence of his innocence.70 
In denying Yonga’s petition, the Court of Appeals noted that Maryland 
Rule 4-331(c)(1),71 which allows a court to grant a new trial for newly dis-
covered evidence, had previously never been asserted in a motion for a trial 
after a plea deal.72  Further, even in the cases where there had been a trial 
prior to conviction, courts “grappled with whether there was a substantial 
[or significant] possibility that a different result would have occurred in the 
trial” had the newly discovered evidence been known at the time.73  In ex-
tending this reasoning to the application of Maryland Rule 4-332, Writ of 
Actual Innocence,74 which directly implements Section 8-301, the court 
added “only a conviction garnered after a bench or jury trial can provide the 
fodder against which the standard in Section 8-301(a)(1) can be meas-
ured.”75  Hence, the court held that “a person who has pled guilty may not 
later avail [themselves] of the relief afforded by the Petition for a Writ of 
Actual Innocence” because there was no trial against which to compare the 
new evidence.76 
Later that same year, in Jamison v. State,77 the Court of Appeals ex-
tended the Yonga rationale to Section 8-201, regarding DNA testing for a 
defendant with an Alford plea.78  This case began in 1990, when William 
Todd Jamison was arrested for “impersonat[ing] a police officer and 
pull[ing] over a young woman in the Towson area of Baltimore County.”79  
Jamison was accused of handcuffing the woman and placing her in the back 
                                                          
 68.  Id. at 188–89, 130 A.3d at 489. 
 69.  Id. at 192–93, 130 A.3d at 491–92. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  MD. R. 4-331(c)(1) (2018).  See MD. R. 4-331(c)(1)(A)–(B) (“Newly Discovered Evi-
dence.  The court may grant a new trial or other appropriate relief on the ground of newly discov-
ered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence [within ten days of a ver-
dict] . . . on motion filed within one year after the later of (A) the date the court imposed sentence 
or (B) the date the court received a mandate issued by the final appellate court to consider . . . a 
belated appeal permitted as postconviction relief.”). 
 72.  Yonga, 446 Md. at 208, 130 A.3d at 500. 
 73.  Id.   
 74.  MD. R. 4-332 (2018). 
 75.  Yonga, 446 Md. at 213, 130 A.3d at 503.   
 76.  Id. at 217, 506. 
 77.  450 Md. 387, 148 A.3d 1267 (2016). 
 78.  Id. at 414, 148 A.3d at 1284; see also supra note 54. 
 79.  Scott D. Shellenberger, State’s Attorney for Balt. Cty., Testimony for Hearing on S.B. 
675 Before the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm. in Opposition to S.B. 675, Petition for Writ of Ac-
tual Innocence, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. 1 (Md. 2017) [hereinafter Shellenberger, Testimony on 
S.B. 675] (on file with author).  Mr. Shellenberger was the lead prosecutor in the Jamison case.  
Id. 
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of his car, driving to another area, removing the woman from his car, and 
then brutally raping, strangling, and beating her for thirty minutes.80  
Jamison was indicted on fifteen charges and sentenced to life plus thirty 
years after he entered an Alford plea to first degree rape and kidnapping.81  
In 2008 (eighteen years into his sentence), Jamison filed a petition for DNA 
testing after “slides containing cellular material from swabs taken from the 
victim’s vulva, vagina, and endocervix” were newly discovered.82 
In denying Jamison’s petition, the court reasoned that Section 8-201 
implicitly prohibited postconviction DNA testing for defendants with plea 
deals because the statute was silent on the matter.83  Further, the court 
equated an Alford plea to a guilty plea: “[A]n Alford plea is the functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea because [l]ike a guilty plea, . . . the Alford plea 
waives challenges to adverse rulings on pretrial motions and all procedural 
objections, . . . limiting appeals to jurisdictional defects and challenges 
based on the propriety of the trial court’s acceptance of the plea.”84  Moreo-
ver, the court reasoned that a 2008 amendment to Section 8-201, that added 
language requiring a substantial possibility that the defendant would not 
have been convicted had the DNA evidence been known at trial, was an in-
applicable standard for defendants with guilty pleas.85  Using the same rea-
soning from Yonga, the court “emphasized the evaluative component of the 
standard of substantial or significant possibility that the result may have 
been different” and determined that newly introduced DNA evidence could 
not be compared against a trial that never occurred.86  Thus, the court held 
“a person who has pled guilty cannot avail [themselves] of post-conviction 
DNA testing under Section 8-201.”87  The consequence of the Jamison de-
cision, with the earlier Yonga decision, was to disrupt the “status quo that 
existed prior to 201[6] . . . [that] allowed people who had been convicted as 
a result of pleas to pursue DNA testing and to present new evidence of in-
nocence under . . . certain circumstances.”88 
                                                          
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Jamison, 450 Md. at 389, 148 A.3d at 1268. 
 82.  Id. at 390, 148 A.3d at 1268–69. 
 83.  Id. at 395–96, 148 A.3d at 1272–73. 
 84.  Id. at 397, 148 A.3d at 1273 (citing Bishop v. State, 417 Md. 1, 20, 7 A.3d 1074, 1085 
(2010)). 
 85.  Id. at 409, 148 A.3d at 1281; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (LexisNexis 
2008).   
 86.  Jamison, 450 Md. at 410, 148 A.3d at 1281.  
 87.  Id. at 414, 148 A.3d at 1284. 
 88.  Statement of Michele Nethercott, U. Balt. Innocence Clinic at 29:55–30:15, Post-
Conviction–DNA Testing and Petition for Actual Innocence: Hearing on S.B. 423 Before the S. 
Judicial Proceedings Comm., 2018 Leg., 438th Sess. (Md. 2018) [hereinafter Statement of 
Michele Nethercott], http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/mga/play/f00eff80-d946-4174-a43f-
14e1bd4a9a82/?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c. 
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D.  In 2018, the Maryland Legislature Restored the New Evidence 
Postconviction Review Mechanisms to Defendants with Plea Deals 
After the Court of Appeals handed down its decisions in Yonga and 
Jamison prohibiting the use of Sections 8-201 and 8-301 for defendants 
with plea deals, the Maryland legislature immediately acted to reestablish 
the pre-2016 status quo by amending the statutes.  The effort to restore ac-
cess to these postconviction remedies (1) stalled in the first year with oppo-
sition from key Maryland stakeholders89 but (2) passed in the second year.90 
1.  Statutory Amendment First Attempt 
In 2017, the Maryland General Assembly introduced Senate Bills 675 
(“S.B. 675”) and 677 (“S.B. 677”) to affirmatively extend Sections 8-201 
and 8-301 to defendants with plea deals, but the effort stalled.91  In support 
of the statutory amendments, Senator Delores Kelley, who had been the 
lead sponsor for the 2009 Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence (Section 8-
301), testified, “[I]t was not the intent of the legislature to limit this mode of 
post-conviction relief to only defendants convicted by a trial.”92  Senator 
Kelley further testified, “A blanket dismissal of all petitions for post-
conviction DNA testing is a threat to public safety, and can leave serial of-
fenders at large who could have been otherwise identified and subsequently 
tried for their offenses.”93 
Senate Bills 675 and 677 generated concern from key stakeholders, 
such as the Maryland Judicial Conference and the Maryland Office of the 
Attorney General (“OAG”), both of whom opposed amending the statutes 
on the ground that the minimalist factual record at the time of pleading 
could not be properly weighed at a subsequent trial.94  The State’s Attorney 
for Baltimore County specifically opposed the Section 8-301 amendment 
and cautioned that allowing new evidence postconviction review for de-
fendants with plea deals would mean “there is no finality for victims any-
                                                          
 89.  See infra Section I.D.1. 
 90.  See infra Section I.D.2. 
 91.  S. 675, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017) (referred to interim study by Judicial Proceed-
ings Comm., Apr. 10, 2017); S. 677, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017) (referred to interim study 
by Judicial Proceedings Comm., Apr. 10, 2017). 
 92.  Delores G. Kelley, Sen., Testimony for Hearing on S.B. 675 Before the S. Judicial Pro-
ceedings Comm. in Support of Criminal Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence-Non-Trial Convic-
tion, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. 2 (Md. 2017) (on file with author).  
 93.  Delores G. Kelley, Sen., Testimony for Hearing on S.B. 677 Before the S. Judicial Pro-
ceedings Comm. in Support of DNA Testing-Post-Conviction Review, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. 3 
(Md. 2017) [hereinafter Sen. Kelley, Testimony on S.B. 677] (on file with author).  
 94.  Md. Judicial Conference, Letter to S. Judicial Proceedings Comm. Opposing S.B. 675, 
2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017) (on file with author); Md. Office of the Att’y Gen., Letter to S. 
Judicial Proceedings Comm. Opposing S.B. 677, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017) [hereinafter 
Letter from Md. Office of the Att’y Gen. Opposing S.B. 677] (on file with author). 
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more.”95  Finally, the Maryland Chiefs of Police Association and the Mary-
land Sheriffs’ Association opposed the amendment to Section 8-201 and 
questioned the need for a procedural change to the law when, under the ex-
isting statute, law enforcement already had access to DNA databases that 
could “identify[] the source of physical evidence used for DNA testing.”96 
The Innocence Project supported amending Sections 8-201 and 8-
301.97  In addition to proffering statistics, such as 84% of wrongfully con-
victed defendants with plea deals are exonerated, the Innocence Project 
pointed out that Maryland was one of only five states (the other states be-
ing: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) that barred postconvic-
tion DNA testing for these defendants.98  According to Amshula Jayaram of 
the Innocence Project and Michele Nethercott of the University of Balti-
more Innocence Clinic, a new evidence postconviction relief mechanism for 
defendants who accept plea deals (1) promotes public safety by focusing 
resources on identifying the real perpetrators, (2) enhances judicial efficien-
cy by “provid[ing] a clear and proper channel for [postconviction] relief,”99 
and (3) gives the public confidence that the criminal justice system is “will-
ing to get it right” by reconsidering convictions when exculpatory evidence 
is newly discovered.100 
The General Assembly did not pass the amendments to Sections 8-201 
and 8-301 in 2017 and instead voted to refer the matter to the Task Force to 
Study Erroneous Conviction and Imprisonment established during the 2017 
legislative session.101  The purpose of the Task Force was threefold: (1) to 
study current Maryland processes for determining erroneous conviction; (2) 
to study other state processes for the same; and (3) to make recommenda-
tions for process improvements in Maryland.102  The Task Force held three 
                                                          
 95.  Shellenberger, Testimony on S.B. 675, supra note 79, at 2. 
 96.  Md. Chiefs of Police Ass’n & Md. Sheriffs’ Ass’n, Letter to the S. Judicial Proceedings 
Comm. Opposing S.B. 677, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017) (on file with author). 
 97.  Nethercott et al., Letter Concerning S.B. 675 and S.B. 677, supra note 23. 
 98.  Id. at 7; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285(5)(d) (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 770.16(1) (West 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.71(F) (LexisNexis 2018).  But see 
42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 9543.1(a)(5) (West 2018) (amending the Pennsylvania postconvic-
tion DNA testing statute in December 2018 to allow defendants with plea deals to assert actual 
innocence under the statute).   
 99.  Nethercott et al., Letter Concerning S.B. 675 and S.B. 677, supra note 23, at 4. 
 100.  Statement of Amshula Jayaram, Innocence Project, Policy Advocate at 14:50, Post-
Conviction–DNA Testing and Petition for Actual Innocence: Hearing on S.B. 423 Before the S. 
Judicial Proceedings Comm., 2018 Leg., 438th Sess. (Md. 2018), 
http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/mga/play/f00eff80-d946-4174-a43f-
14e1bd4a9a82/?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c .  
 101.  S. 675, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017) (voting record); S. 677, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. 
(Md. 2017) (voting record). 
 102.  Letter from V. Glenn Fueston, Jr., Exec. Dir., Governor’s Office of Crime Control & 
Prevention, to Hon. Larry Hogan et al. (Dec. 28, 2017), http://goccp.maryland.gov/wp-
content/uploads/erroneous-conviction-imprisonment-20171228-letter.pdf.  
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meetings from October 2017 to September 2018 and issued its final report 
in December 2018.103  Although members of the Task Force played a role 
in amending Sections 8-201 and 8-301 in 2018, the legislature’s effort to 
extend the statutes in 2017 stalled.104 
2.  Statutory Amendment Second Attempt 
In 2018, the General Assembly returned from its recess, again took up 
the matter of amending Sections 8-201 and 8-301, and, this time, succeed-
ed.105  Senator Robert Zirkin introduced Senate Bill 423 (“S.B. 423”) that 
combined the two Bills, S.B. 675 and S.B. 677, from the previous year.106  
The legislative intent of S.B. 423 was to (1) amend Sections 8-201 and 8-
301 jointly; (2) provide similar procedures to allow postconviction DNA 
testing and petition for writ of actual innocence for defendants with plea 
deals;107 and (3) create a comprehensive postconviction review process 
where Maryland defendants “would have the ability to challenge unlawful 
and unjust convictions.”108 
Once again, several Maryland stakeholders expressed their concerns 
over the proposed Section 8-201 and 8-301 amendments.  The Maryland 
Judicial Conference opposed S.B. 423 on the same grounds as in 2017.109  
The State’s Attorney for Baltimore County asked the legislature to “[l]et the 
Task Force [to Study Erroneous Conviction and Imprisonment] do its job” 
of further studying the issue of postconviction review.110  The Maryland 
Crime Victims’ Resource Center (“MCVRC”) opposed the amendments 
over the issue of finality and urged the General Assembly to avoid the “up-
ending of final, proper convictions” by using postconviction review “as a 
pretext to obtain untimely judicial review and potentially reopen cases es-
                                                          
 103.  GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2018 FINAL REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE TO STUDY ERRONEOUS CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT (2018), 
http://goccp.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/erroneous-conviction-imprisonment-20181201-
final-report.pdf. 
 104.  Id. at 13. 
 105.  Act of May 15, 2018, ch. 602, sec. 1–2, 2018 Md. Laws 3127, 3128–37 (codified as 
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 8-201, 8-301 (LexisNexis 2018)). 
 106.  S. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM., FLOOR REPORT: SENATE BILL 423, 2018 Leg., 438th 
Sess. (Md. 2018). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  S.J. Res. 10, 2018 Leg., 438th Sess., at 2 (Md. 2018). 
 109.  Md. Judicial Conference, Letter to S. Judicial Proceedings Comm. Opposing S.B. 423, 
2018 Leg., 438th Sess. (Md. 2018) [hereinafter Letter from Md. Judicial Conference on S.B. 423] 
(on file with author). 
 110.  Scott D. Shellenberger, State’s Attorney for Balt. Cty., Testimony for Hearing on S.B. 
423 Before the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm. in Opposition to DNA Testing-Postconviction Re-
view, 2018 Leg., 438th Sess. 2 (Md. 2018) [hereinafter Shellenberger, Testimony on S.B. 423] (on 
file with author). 
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pecially long after the case can be effectively retried.”111  The Maryland 
State Bar Association (“MSBA”) opposed the Bill over its concern regard-
ing excessive use of judicial resources that would burden the judicial sys-
tem and negatively impact the judiciary’s ability to fulfill its mandate.112  
The only favorable testimony came from the Innocence Project, which re-
newed its support for the Section 8-201 and 8-301 amendments on the same 
grounds as in 2017.113  On March 21, 2018, the General Assembly unani-
mously passed S.B. 423 and permanently granted access to the new evi-
dence postconviction review mechanisms for defendants with plea deals.114 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The Maryland legislature’s proposal to affirmatively extend Sections 
8-201 and 8-301 to postconviction review of plea deals using new evidence 
had its detractors, but the legislature listened to their concerns and adjusted 
the language of S.B. 423 accordingly.115  Moreover, Senator Zirkin made 
clear that he was less interested in continuing to study the issue of postcon-
viction review, as had been recommended by the State’s Attorney for Bal-
timore County,116 and more interested in incorporating language into S.B. 
423 that supported the legislature’s intent to establish a permanent mecha-
nism for wrongfully convicted defendants to prove their innocence.117  Sec-
tion A reviews how the legislature satisfied the concerns of the judiciary by 
providing procedural guidance and giving the court discretionary authority 
to protect judicial resources.118  Section B analyzes how the legislature sat-
isfied the State’s burden of building a postconviction review case from a 
                                                          
 111.  Md. Crime Victims’ Res. Ctr., Inc., Testimony for Hearing on S.B. 423 Before the S. Ju-
dicial Proceedings Comm. in Opposition to Postconviction–DNA Testing and Petition for Writ of 
Actual Innocence, 2018 Leg., 438th Sess. 1 (Md. 2018) [hereinafter Md. Crime Victims’ Res. Ctr., 
Inc., Testimony on S.B. 423] (on file with author). 
 112.  Md. State Bar Ass’n, Letter to the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm. Opposing S.B. 423, 
2018 Leg., 438th Sess. (Md. 2018) [hereinafter Letter from Md. State Bar Ass’n Opposing S.B. 
423] (on file with author); see also RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY III, MD. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
MSBA BILL POSITIONS AND FINAL BILL STATUS 5–6 (2018), 
https://www.msba.org/content/uploads/sites/7/2018/05/MSBA-Bill-Positions-2018.pdf (stating 
that MSBA supports S.B. 423 overall but the broad provisions of the Bill risk overwhelming lim-
ited judicial resources).  
 113.  Jayaram, Testimony on S.B. 423, supra note 20, at 1. 
 114.  S. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM., VOTING RECORD: SENATE BILL 423, 2018 Leg., 
438th Sess.  (Md. 2018). 
 115.  See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 116.  Shellenberger, Testimony on S.B. 423, supra note 110, at 2. 
 117.  Statement of Sen. Robert Zirkin at 1:09:30–1:10:50, Post-Conviction–DNA Testing and 
Petition for Actual Innocence: Hearing on S.B. 423 Before the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm., 
2018 Leg., 438th Sess. (Md. 2018) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Zirkin], 
http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/mga/play/f00eff80-d946-4174-a43f-
14e1bd4a9a82/?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c. 
 118.  See infra Section II.A.1–2. 
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minimalist factual record.119  Section C explains how newly discovered evi-
dence favors substantive accuracy over finality.120  Ultimately, the amend-
ments to Sections 8-201 and 8-301 that permitted access to the new evi-
dence postconviction review mechanisms for defendants with plea deals 
satisfied detractors of the legislation and aligned with the Maryland legisla-
ture’s intent. 
A.  The Maryland Legislature Satisfied the Judiciary’s Procedural 
Guidance and Resources Concerns 
The General Assembly made several adjustments to S.B. 423 to pro-
tect the interests of the Maryland judiciary.  The General Assembly modi-
fied S.B. 423 to (1) establish judicial procedures for postconviction review 
of plea deals using newly discovered evidence;121 and (2) give the court 
discretionary authority over petitions for new evidence postconviction re-
view in order to protect judicial resources.122 
1.  The Legislature Provided Procedural Guidance 
The Maryland judiciary was concerned that postconviction review of 
pleas deals lacked sufficient procedural guidance to evaluate newly discov-
ered evidence.123  The judiciary based its opposition to the Section 8-201 
and 8-301 amendments on the court’s inability “to determine what weight 
to give” the minimalist factual record in a plea deal at a subsequent trial.124  
This was the same concern articulated by the Court of Appeals in Yonga 
when the court reiterated its previous holding that “there was a dearth of 
‘rules of procedure to guide the process’” for a trial under Section 8-301 for 
a defendant who accepted a plea deal.125  Moreover, in Jamison, the court 
posited that “legislative action may be more appropriate, should the Legis-
lature choose to act, because of the numerous variables that need to be con-
sidered to define the boundaries of post-conviction DNA testing, were the 
petitioner to have pled guilty.”126  The General Assembly understood these 
concerns to be a request from the judiciary for statutory guidance on the 
evaluation of newly discovered evidence at postconviction review.127  The 
                                                          
 119.  See infra Section II.B.1–2. 
 120.  See infra Section II.C. 
 121.  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 122.  See infra Section II.A.2. 
 123.  Letter from Md. Judicial Conference Opposing S.B. 423, supra note 109. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  446 Md. 183, 209, 130 A.3d 486, 501 (2015) (citing State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 
298, 999 A.2d 1050, 1057 (2010)). 
 126.  450 Md. 387, 414, 148 A.3d 1267, 1284 (2016). 
 127.  Statement of Sen. Delores G. Kelley at 25:45, 26:33, Post-Conviction–DNA Testing and 
Petition for Actual Innocence: Hearing on S.B. 423 Before the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm., 
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Floor Report for S.B. 423, therefore, summarized the purpose of the Bill as 
“establish[ing] procedures for postconviction DNA testing . . . when a ver-
dict of guilty was reached as a result of a plea of guilty, an Alford plea, or a 
plea of nolo contendere . . . [and] establish[ing] similar procedures in con-
nection with a petition for writ of actual innocence”128 
In Maryland, a defendant may seek a judicial remedy for a wrongful 
conviction via a direct appeal, a motion for a new trial, or a postconviction 
review.129  Of these three judicial remedies, postconviction review is the 
preferred method for seeking redress for a defendant with a plea deal be-
cause (1) a direct appeal is limited to the minimalist factual record; (2) time 
constraints on filing a motion for a new trial may preclude the discovery of 
new evidence; and (3) postconviction review “allows a person to challenge 
[their] conviction using grounds that could not have been raised on direct 
appeal” or on a motion for a new trial.130  For crimes under Maryland law, 
one such ground for postconviction review is newly discovered evidence 
and, particularly, DNA evidence.131 
The United States Supreme Court noted in District Attorney’s Office 
for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne132 that “DNA evidence will un-
doubtedly lead to changes in the criminal justice system,” but the Court did 
not specify whether the legislature or the judiciary would revise the rules of 
criminal procedure to keep up with these changes.133  In Maryland, the leg-
islature took the lead by enacting procedural rules for postconviction review 
that included (1) managing untimely postconviction reviews;134 (2) adopt-
ing the Post-Conviction DNA Testing Rule to specify additional procedures 
for introducing and evaluating DNA evidence;135 and (3) making several 
clarifying amendments to Sections 8-201 and 8-301 that incrementally 
broadened the scope of each statute.136  Then, in response to the Court of 
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 128.  S. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM., FLOOR REPORT: SENATE BILL 423, 2018 Reg. Sess., 
at 1 (Md. 2018) (emphasis added). 
 129.  MD. R. 8-131 (2018); MD. R. 7-101–109 (2018); MD. R. 4-331 (2018).   
 130.  King, supra note 12, at 1–2, 4. 
 131.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 8-201, 8-301 (LexisNexis 2018). 
 132.  557 U.S. 52 (2009). 
 133.  Id. at 74. 
 134.  Rule 4-331(c)(1), which permits newly discovered evidence to trigger a belated appeal; 
Rule 4-331(c)(2), which mandates no time requirement for DNA testing; Rule 4-332(c), which 
allows a petition for writ of actual innocence to be filed at any time. 
 135.  See MD. R. 4-701–711 (2018) (specifying the procedural rules for postconviction DNA 
testing); MD. R. 4-331(d) (2018) (“DNA Evidence.  If the defendant seeks a new trial or other ap-
propriate relief under . . . § 8-201, the defendant shall proceed in accordance with Rules 4-701 
through 4-711.”). 
 136.  See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (LexisNexis 2018) (amended 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2009, 2015) (focusing on the following broadening amendments: (1) mandating the preser-
vation of biological evidence for use in DNA testing; (2) requiring a law enforcement database 
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Appeal’s rulings in Yonga and Jamison, the legislature amended Sections 8-
201 and 8-301 to provide broad procedural guidance for postconviction re-
view of plea deals when new evidence emerges.137  With this latest guid-
ance, the legislature gave the court a higher evidentiary standard against 
which to weigh newly discovered evidence and expanded the admissible ev-
idence for postconviction review.138  Thus, the legislature provided the stat-
utory guidance that the judiciary requested to evaluate new evidence at 
postconviction review. 
2.  The Legislature Gave the Court Discretionary Authority to 
Protect Judicial Resources 
Expressing a perceived need to protect judicial resources, the MSBA 
opposed the Section 8-201 and 8-301 amendments due to its concern that 
postconviction review of plea deals using new evidence would overly bur-
den the judicial system.139  This concern manifested itself in the original 
version of S.B. 423 that limited a court to two options when newly discov-
ered evidence met the evidentiary standard in the statute: ordering a new 
trial or vacating a conviction.140  The OAG objected to this language on the 
grounds that a court could not use its own discretion in determining which 
cases qualify for postconviction review.141  In its testimony, the OAG noted 
that courts routinely see petitions for new trials many years after conviction, 
and the ability to effectively prosecute these cases depends on caseload and 
budgetary constraints.142  Hence, it may be inferred that depriving a court of 
its discretion on whether or not to hear cases could overly burden the judi-
cial system with petitions for postconviction review.143  The General As-
                                                          
search if there is a reasonable probability that the evidence is exculpatory or mitigating; and (3) 
directing the court to order a new trial if there is a substantial possibility that the defendant would 
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 143.  Statement of Carrie Williams, supra note 141; Letter from Md. Office of the Att’y Gen. 
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sembly subsequently struck the provisions requiring a new trial or vacating 
a conviction and gave the court the discretion to hear postconviction review 
cases as the court deems appropriate.144 
To further ensure the protection of judicial resources, the General As-
sembly conducted a fiscal impact study of S.B. 423.145  The General As-
sembly determined that the Section 8-201 and 8-301 amendments “[are] not 
expected to materially affect State finances . . . [and are] not expected to 
materially affect local finances or circuit court caseloads.”146  Finally, the 
Innocence Project quelled concerns that postconviction review of plea deals 
when new evidence emerges would result in a “flood of litigation” because, 
after 2001 and 2009 when Sections 8-201 and 8-301 were passed, the judi-
cial system had not experienced a surge in postconviction review litiga-
tion.147  Hence, by giving the Maryland judiciary the discretion on whether 
or not to hear postconviction review of plea deals using newly discovered 
evidence, the General Assembly adequately ensured that judicial system re-
sources would not be overburdened. 
B.  The Maryland Legislature Satisfied the State’s Concerns About the 
Minimalist Factual Record 
The General Assembly acknowledged that the minimalist factual rec-
ord of a plea deal is “the challenge of this Bill” when it made several ad-
justments to S.B. 423 to protect the interests of the State of Maryland.148  
The General Assembly addressed the issue of building a postconviction re-
view case from the minimalist factual record by (1) rejecting the substantial 
and significant possibility evidentiary standard for newly discovered evi-
dence;149 and (2) relaxing the admissibility of evidence in postconviction 
review of plea deals.150 
1.  The Legislature Rejected the Substantial and Significant 
Possibility Evidentiary Standard for Postconviction Review 
In the first draft of S.B. 423, the evidentiary standard for newly dis-
covered evidence was a substantial or significant possibility that the de-
fendant would not have been convicted had the evidence been known at the 
                                                          
 144.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 8-201(i)(4)(i)(1)–(3), 8-301(f)(2)(ii)(1)–(2) (LexisNex-
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 149.  See infra Section II.B.1. 
 150.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
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time of conviction.151  In Yonga, when the court stated, “No case has been 
located . . . in which a motion for new trial under Rule 4-331(c)(1) has been 
asserted when the proponent pled guilty,” the court reasoned that the sub-
stantial or significant possibility standard152 under Section 8-301 for intro-
ducing new evidence at postconviction review only applied to trials.153  In 
its Yonga and Jamison decisions, the Court of Appeals cited the Court of 
Special Appeals for its description of the “process of determining ‘substan-
tial or significant possibility,’” also known as the “before and after” test:154 
In every newly discovered evidence case, including newly dis-
covered DNA evidence or other newly discovered evidence of ac-
tual innocence, there is a universally recognized procedure for 
measuring the persuasive weight of such newly discovered evi-
dence.  That is the “before and after” test.  We first look at the ev-
idence of guilt before the jury at the trial that led to the convic-
tion.  We then look at the newly discovered evidence.  The acid 
test is to ask whether, if that jury had had the benefit of the newly 
discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, 
would there be “a substantial or significant possibility that the re-
sult would have been different?”  There is no way that such a test 
can be applied, however, to a conviction based on a guilty plea ra-
ther than upon a trial.  The minimalist statement of facts offered 
in factual support of a guilty plea is no equivalent of or substitute 
for an actual trial.  It was never intended to be.155 
The State enters only a minimalist factual record in support of a plea 
deal because the State is relieved of its burden of proof to show that the de-
fendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.156  In contrast to a conviction 
by trial, in a plea deal the defendant admits to the elements of the crime but 
essentially agrees to a “criminal settlement” without factual findings or the 
resolution of legal claims.157  Although no jury actually sees the evidentiary 
record at postconviction review, the court attempts to get inside the hypo-
thetical jury’s head and determine whether an average juror “could have 
convicted the defendant on the evidence presented.”158  Hence, the court 
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must make this determination based on a minimalist factual record and pos-
sibly years after conviction when “[w]itnesses [may] have died, memories 
[may] have faded, [and] evidence [may have] been lost or destroyed.  A 
case that may have been ironclad on the day of the guilty plea may now be 
impossible to try.”159 
When the General Assembly introduced S.B. 423 in January 2018, the 
Bill established a “substantial or significant” evidentiary standard for new 
evidence introduced in the postconviction review of plea deals.160  In sup-
port of this standard, Senator Kelley, on behalf of the General Assembly, 
asserted the following: 
While a statement of facts offered by the State in support of a 
plea is necessarily shorter than a trial record, the statement of 
facts tendered by the State in support of a plea is typically a 
lengthy, comprehensive, and detailed summary of all incriminat-
ing evidence available to the State at the time of the plea . . . .161 
In her testimony on behalf of the OAG, however, Carrie Williams ob-
jected to the substantial or significant possibility standard on the grounds 
that it established a lower burden of proof for new evidence, thus affecting 
the State’s ability to effectively prosecute a plea deal case from the mini-
malist factual record.162  Moreover, the OAG asserted that this standard for 
postconviction review of plea deals was not used by the vast majority of 
other jurisdictions.163  The General Assembly asked the OAG to suggest an 
appropriate evidentiary standard for use in Maryland, and the OAG offered 
a standard that combined language from the federal,164 Arizona,165 and Del-
aware166 postconviction statutes, as follows: 
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[C]onsidering all of the admissible evidence, whether or not prof-
fered in support of the guilty plea, there is compelling evidence 
that no reasonable jury would convict the defendant, in light of 
the newly discovered evidence, the DNA testing, and all of the 
evidence that the State has whether or not it was admitted in sup-
port of the guilty plea.167 
Subsequent to the OAG’s testimony, the General Assembly struck out 
the substantial or significant possibility standard from S.B. 423 and re-
placed it with “establish[] by clear and convincing evidence the petitioner’s 
actual innocence of the offense.”168  The General Assembly approved this 
higher burden of proof for new evidence and thereby eased the State’s bur-
den in making its case using the minimalist factual record at postconviction 
review.169 
2.  The Legislature Relaxed the Admissibility of Evidence for the 
State 
In oral testimony, the OAG advised the General Assembly that be-
cause the plea deal factual record is designed to be minimalist, the State 
does not include all of its admissible evidence in the case record at plead-
ing.170  The OAG further observed that S.B. 423 lacked language allowing 
the prosecution to subsequently introduce this evidence at postconviction 
review.171  Consequently, the General Assembly modified S.B. 423 to per-
mit, after obtaining the court’s approval, the submission of (1) evidence 
from the factual record at pleading; (2) any admissible evidence that was in 
the possession of law enforcement but was not added to the factual record at 
the time of pleading; and (3) any relevant evidence that came into existence 
after the plea was entered.172  By including this language in the amendments 
to Sections 8-201 and 8-301, the General Assembly aided the State’s ability 
to build on the minimalist factual record by relaxing the admissibility of ev-
idence and “[d]eveloping more facts as part of the record at the guilt phase” 
to better withstand postconviction review.173 
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C.  Newly Discovered Evidence Favors Substantive Accuracy over 
Finality 
Finality in American jurisprudence recognizes that “we can never 
know with 100% certainty that no error of law or fact was made during trial 
or appellate proceedings.”174  The pursuit of finality relies on a legal system 
that “provide[s] a reasoned and acceptable probability that justice will be 
done, that the facts found will be ‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’”175  
Litigation, however, must end because, without finality, wealthy parties 
could use their resources to postpone final judgment and bring the justice 
system to a standstill.176  Although it is impossible to know for certain that 
justice is done in every case, the introduction of new evidence at postcon-
viction review has the potential to improve the substantive accuracy of con-
victions.177  In the case of DNA, defendants are identified from the biologi-
cal material they leave behind at the crime scene.178  DNA evidence may 
not only inculpate a defendant who was at the crime scene, but it may ex-
culpate a defendant who was not at the crime scene and, thus, call into ques-
tion the identity of the actual perpetrator.179  Hence, newly discovered evi-
dence favors substantive accuracy over finality. 
Placing accuracy above finality is a problem for victim groups, like the 
MCVRC, that warned the General Assembly against the “wrongful upend-
ing of final, proper convictions” in the postconviction review of plea deals 
when new evidence is discovered.180  MCVRC acknowledged that innocent 
defendants may have reasons for taking plea deals, but MCVRC empha-
sized “[c]rime victims, likewise, have an interest in avoiding unnecessary 
confrontations with those who perpetrated crimes against them and their 
loved ones.”181  To ensure that S.B. 423 protected finality, MCVRC pro-
posed five amendments to the Bill182 that the General Assembly chose not 
to incorporate into the S.B. 423 amendments.183 
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Although reopening cases for wrongfully convicted defendants can be 
painful to victims and their families,184 failing to do so risks public safety 
by “leav[ing] serial offenders at large who could have been otherwise iden-
tified and subsequently tried for their offenses.”185  When asked about the 
impact on victims of a notice of rehearing in a plea deal, the Innocence Pro-
ject testified that, in spite of the pain of a rehearing, no victim had ever said 
that they would prefer that an innocent defendant remain incarcerated.186  
Therefore, newly discovered evidence that favors substantive accuracy over 
finality has the potential to identify wrongfully convicted defendants and 
bring the real criminal perpetrators to justice.187 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Maryland legislature intended that wrongfully convicted defend-
ants with plea deals should have the “ability to challenge unlawful and un-
just convictions.”188  The legislature initiated an effort to amend the statues 
governing newly discovered evidence at postconviction review after the ju-
diciary barred access to these mechanisms for defendants with plea deals.189  
When the Bill stalled in its first passage attempt in 2017,190 the legislature 
subsequently satisfied the concerns of key Maryland stakeholders and ulti-
mately passed the Section 8-201 and 8-301 new evidence postconviction 
review amendments in 2018.191 
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